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The Demise of China’s Peasantry as a Class
Sally Sargeson
Theorists of class have long predicted the end of
the peasantry: Marx, Hobsbawm and Bernstein
have  all  argued  that  in  the  transition  to
capitalism, peasants would be either transformed
into individual specialized commodity producers
(commercial farmers), or forced into wage-labour
by  fragmentation  of  their  land  holdings,  and
dispossession, debt and impoverishment.1 On the
other  hand,  these  theorists  have  been
uncharacteristically ambivalent about whether or
not the peasantry constitutes a class.  Marx, for
example,  argued  that  although  peasants’
economic  exploitation  and  political  and  social
subordination  placed  them  in  an  antagonistic
relationship with other classes, they lacked any
consciousness of, and capacity to articulate, their
common  class  interests,  much  less  organize
politically.2 Pointing to the uneven, contradictory
impacts of globalized agriculture and consequent
differentiation among agriculturalists, Bernstein,
too,  cautions  that  ‘“the  peasantry” is  hardly  a
uniform or analytically helpful social category in
contemporary  capitalism… The  same  stricture
necessarily applies to any views of peasants as a
(single) “class” (“exploited” or otherwise)’.3
Many Chinese political leaders and scholars also
have predicted the eventual end of the country’s
peasantry.  Mao  Zedong  bel ieved  that
differentiation  among  the  peasantry  would  be
eliminated  through  the  creation  of  collective
ownership and socialist relations of production
in  the  countryside.  Eventually,  with  the
transition to communism, full public ownership
would  efface  material  and political  differences
between  town  and  country,  workers  and
peasants, mental and manual labour.4 Post-Mao
liberal  writers  have  tended  to  emphasize
demographic  transition  and  markets  as  forces
stratifying  the  peasantry  and shifting  peasants
into  non-agricultural  occupations.5  Despite
envisaging different paths to de-peasantization,
both  Maoists  and  post-Mao  liberal  scholars
viewed the end of the peasantry as imperative for
China’s modernization and rise to global power.6
In Qin Hui’s words, ‘If China is to be modernized
and its peasants are to become modern citizens,
the transformation of peasant into farmer cannot
be avoided’.7
Are  we  witnessing  the  demise  of  China’s
peasantry as a class? Bernstein notes that ‘a class
can only be identified through its relations with
another class’.8  If  we accept this  premise what
types of changes can we trace in the peasant class
in  China’s  recent  past,  present  and  imagined
future?
Answers to these questions will be sensitive to
the way we define the two key terms, class and
peasantry.  Here,  I  interpret  class  as  the  social
formations that arise from relations of property
ownership, labour and capital accumulation, and
which  are  expressed  and  consolidated  by
economic, political, social and cultural practices.
This  interpretation  admittedly  glides  over
important  theoretical  debates.  However,  it  has
the merit of accommodating Marxist arguments
that class is rooted in ownership and control of
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the means of production and exploitative wage
labour, as well as Weberian postulates that status
groups based on power, education, occupation,
and cultural capital form in all complex modern
societies.  Identifying  peasants  as  a  class  thus
requires attention to the way they are set apart
and  –  potentially  –  against  other  social
formations  by  the  following  associations:
Economic:  shared  experiences  of
ownership,  control  or rental  of  property,
employment  relations,  and  the  wealth,
income, working and living conditions that
shape  people’s  perceptions  of  their
material  interests;
Political:  practices  that  create  bases  for
collective action and contestation in fields
of  power  and  material  distribution,
including through protest,  representation
in  organizations,  advocacy  and  what
Kerkvliet  calls  the  ‘everyday  politics’  of
making  rules  about  the  production,
entitlement  to  and  use  of  goods  and
resources.9
Social:  the  structure  and  composition  of
households,  residential  communities  and
work  places,  and  the  regulations  and
norms  that  educate  people,  and  govern
membership  of  and  interaction  in  social
places;
Cultural and cognitive: styles of learning
and living that express people’s views of
themselves as social groups distinct from
other social formations, and which inflect
how  they  experience  and  make  those
relationships  meaningful  in  everyday
speech,  stories,  consumption  and
in terac t ion ,  and  t ransmi t  these
relationships  intergenerationally.
Peasants then may be broadly defined by three
characteristics  that  distinguish  it  from  other
agriculturalists. First, peasants are small-holding
agriculturalists.  Second,  peasants  primarily  use
unwaged family labour in farming that supports
their household consumption and reproduction,
and meets demands from dominant classes for
taxes, rents and debt repayment.10 Third, partly
as  a  consequence of  the  former characteristics,
peasants are only partially integrated into, and
dependent upon, markets. Friedmann is quoted
in Zhang and Donaldson’s 2010 paper arguing
that peasants’ ‘access to land, labour, credit, and
product markets is mediated through direct, non-
monetary  ties  to  other  households  or  classes’,
rather  than  through  monetised  transactions  in
markets.11 For example, the acquisition of inputs,
organization  of  production  and distribution  of
produce  frequently  involve  norm-governed
reciprocal exchange with kin and neighbours, or
provision of  corvée  labour  and a  share  of  the
harvest in return for gaining access to land from
landlord-patrons  or  socialist  state  planning
bureaucrats  and  cadres.
Zhang  and  Donaldson  suggest  that  these
relationships  are  useful  in  differentiating
peasants  from  other  agriculturalists,  for
agribusinesses  use  paid  workers,  while
commercial  family  farmers  source  their  inputs
and sell  most of their produce in markets.12  In
contrast, critics such as Ploeg have argued that
the  distinction  between  peasant  farming  and
other  modes  of  agricultural  production  is
overdrawn, for there is considerable overlap and
interaction among peasants, commercial farmers
and  agribusinesses,  as  well  as  peasant
involvement in labour markets.13 Yet definitional
rigour  provides  greater  analytical  traction  in
identifying and tracing temporal changes in the
peasantry  relative  to  other  classes.  For  this
reason, the working definition of peasant used in
this paper centres on:
small-holding  agriculture  as  a  primary
occupation;
reliance upon unwaged family labour and
ties  to  dominant  classes  or  groups  for
production and social reproduction;
limited market participation.
Below,  I  use  these  definitions  of  class  and
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peasants to trace changes in China’s peasantry as
a class — or spectrum of peasant classes in Mao’s
terminology— in  the  recent  past,  present,  and
future as imagined by Chinese policy experts. I
will  argue  that  while  China’s  rural  residents
(nongmin)  constituted  peasant  class(es)  in  the
first  few  decades  of  the  People’s  Republic  of
China, by the beginning of the 21st century, most
people registered as nongmin were not peasants,
and  did  not  constitute  a  class  vis-à-vis  other
classes.  Instead,  many  contemporary  nongmin
had become capitalist farmers, business people,
migrant  workers  in  commerce,  industry,
construction and transport, rentier landlords, and
unemployed recipients of state welfare.
Before setting out this argument, however, it is
worth noting changes in the etymological  uses
and policy implications of the terms peasant in
English  and nongmin  in  Chinese.  The  English
term  ‘peasant’  derives  from  the  old  French
paisent, ‘country-dweller’, which entered English
between  the  13th  and  15th  centuries.  ‘Peasant’
usually  is  translated into Chinese as  nongmin.
Certainly,  the  simplest  meaning of  both  terms
refers  to  the  occupation  of  small-holding
agriculturalist.  But  the  term  nongmin  is
comparatively new, having come into everyday
usage in Chinese only in the early 20th century,
through  works  on  agricultural  technologies,
economic disciplines and political  theories that
were  translated  from  Japanese  and  European
languages.14 These works contributed to Chinese
intellectuals’ diagnosis that a ‘crisis’  in peasant
farming was one of the root causes of China’s
weakness  vis  à  vis  the  colonial  powers.
Consequently, one of the meanings inherent in
the twentieth century use of the term nongmin is
backwardness:  pre-modern  characteristics
associated with dirt, hard-scrabble labour, and a
lack of formal education, high culture and social
graces. In a China bent on modernization in the
twentieth century, as in England during the 19th
century,  the  term was by no means a  socially
neutral one. Rather, it denoted the speaker as a
superior  modern,  and  the  referent  as  a  ‘pre-
modern’ subject.15
In  describing  China’s  poor  and  lower-middle
peasants as a potential revolutionary force and
‘good’ classes from the 1920s through the mid
20th  century, Mao Zedong elevated nongmin  in
revolutionary parlance.  Yet  by adopting Soviet
economic  blueprints  for  primitive  socialist
accumulation  in  the  1950s,  Mao  also  was
instrumental in implementing the very policies
that  fixed  nongmin  to  a  binary  system  of
population classification that would allow nong
(agriculture)  to  be  milked  to  fund  gong
(industry).  Between  1957  and  1958,  every
household was registered as either agricultural
(nongye hukou) or non-agricultural (fei nongye
hukou). The labels were and are consequential.
As  agricultural  surplus  and  state  investment
disproportionately  were  directed  toward
industrialization and urban settlements,  people
with fei nong hukou became entitled to jobs in
the state and urban collective sectors, and state-
funded  public  goods.  Not  so,  those  with
nongmin hukou: they had to fend for themselves.
Without work and travel passes nongmin could
only obtain food, housing and medical attention
in  the  villages  in  which  their  hukou  was
registered16. Other than by joining the military or
getting into university (‘as difficult as “climbing
up to heaven without a ladder”’,  writes Gao,17
nongmin rarely were able to alter their hukou. In
sum,  beginning  in  the  1950s,  the  residential
registrat ion  system  created  one  of  the
foundations for rapid socialist accumulation by
locking nongmin in place and to an agricultural
livelihood, and channelling resources away from
the countryside and toward industry and state-
sector urban workers.
With minor modifications, the binary residential
registration  of  China’s  population  and  biased
state  investment endured into the 21st  century.
What changed from the 1980s forward was that
the  term  nongmin  began  to  signify  someone
registered  as  a  rural  resident,  rather  than
someone  who  farmed  a  small-holding  in  the
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countryside.  On  the  other  hand,  describing
someone as ‘nongmin’ still implies that they are
naïve,  uncouth,  a  ‘hick’  or  ‘redneck’.  Hence,  a
discourse analysis might well conclude that the
term  nongmin  continues  to  perform  a  class-
sorting function.
1933–1978:  Peasant  classes  in  Maoist  theory,
policy and practice
In 1933, Mao Zedong outlined seemingly simple
criteria  to  be  used  to  identify  exploitative
economic relations in the countryside: landlords
and rich peasants lived off  income made from
renting land and lending money to middle and
poor peasants, and hiring the labour of the poor
and landless.18  Hence,  in the years 1947-53 the
Communist Party despatched land reform teams
to the countryside to determine how much land
and  money  each  family  owned,  and  whether
their  land  was  farmed  by  hired  labour.
Application of these criteria was meant to ensure
that land would be taken from landlords and rich
peasants to be distributed among the poor and
landless  peasants  that  the  Communist  Party
viewed as one of its key constituencies. In much
of the North China plain and lower reaches of the
Yangtze,  however,  there  simply  were  too  few
landlords  with  sufficiently  large  properties  to
provide  surplus  land  for  redistribution.19  The
majority of the population either had just enough
land to get by, or eked out a living tilling tiny
plots  and  working  for  others  or  engaging  in
home-based craft production or petty trade.
To  overcome  this  distributive  problem  and
generate  political  support  in  the  countryside,
during  land  reform  peasant  households  were
assigned to a class based on both their income
from property, hired labour and usury, and their
social  and  political  background.  The  resulting
class designations comprised enemy ‘bad classes’
( l and lo rds ,  r i ch  peasan t s ,  coun te r -
revolutionaries,  Japanese  collaborators  and
criminals),  and  those  with  good  class  origins
(poor,  lower-middle  and  middle  peasants,
Communist  Party  members  and  soldiers).  Not
only did some of these class labels have little to
do  with  Marxist  class  analysis,  but  as  Philip
Huang writes,  the Party’s strategic decision ‘to
make  land  reform  a  moral  drama  of  class
struggle for every village and every peasant was
to  turn  into  a  powerful  imperat ive  to
manufacture  class  enemies  even  where  none
objectively  existed’.20  In  struggle  meetings
everywhere,  peasants  were  urged  to  identify,
shame and even beat neighbours who once had
exploited  them,  sided  with  the  Nationalists
against  the  Communists,  or  collaborated  with
Imperialist invaders.
Drawing class lines on this basis had immediate
distributive effects and political consequences. In
the years 1947-53 titles to approximately 43 per
cent of China’s cultivated land were transferred
from  the  bad  classes  to  good  classes.21  Most
middle peasants retained their holdings, but after
land reform even these better-off households still
held just one quarter of a hectare per capita, on
average.22  Land reform certainly  destroyed the
property  and power  of  much of  the  old  rural
ruling  class.  However,  it  left  most  households
with small, scattered plots, and little in the way
of  capital,  tools  and  machinery  or  draught
animals.  In  short,  it  created  a  small-holding
agricultural  economy  that  barely  met  the
subsistence needs of the population, much less
being able to produce the surpluses that China’s
leaders  needed  to  fund  the  country ’s
industrialization. Communist cadres argued that
the small-holding economy also was nurturing
petty-bourgeois  individualism  and  ‘small
peasant’  mentalities  that  were  impeding
implementation  of  the  Party’s  revolutionary
political  and  social  agenda.23
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To curb this drift into the historical cul-de-sac of
a peasant economy and establish the foundations
for state extraction of agricultural surplus, Party
leaders began accelerating the speed and scale of
collectivization. Peasants’ voluntary formation of
co-operatives  was  soon  overtaken  by  national
campaigns to establish advanced co-operatives.
In  1956,  all  privately  owned  rural  land  and
machinery  were  pooled  under  co-operatives’
collective ownership.24 These initiatives triggered
widespread  peasant  protests.25  Co-operatives
were  tasked  with  controlling  production,
investment,  distribution  and  consumption  in
almost every sphere of rural life, and managing
ideological propaganda, education, welfare and
health. Though ‘black’ market transactions could
not be eliminated,26 private trade was suppressed
by  compulsory  state  procurement  quotas  for
produce,  the  creation  of  an  artificial  ‘price
scissors’ between agricultural produce and urban
manufactured  goods,  and  repeated  campaigns
against residual ‘sprouts of capitalism’.
Collectivization  eliminated  property  ownership
as  a  determinant  of  income.  Gone,  was  the
economic basis of material relations that defined
class positions in Marxist and Maoist theory. In
return for each task allocated by their team leader
and  completed,  farmers  received  work  points
which  could  be  redeemed at  year’s  end for  a
share of the harvest surplus and money received
by the commune brigade (in the Great Leap of
1958-9),  or,  in  the  1960s  and  1970s,  their
production team, for delivering produce to the
state. Obviously, collectivization also altered the
scale  at  which  people  participated  in  farming,
giving vast  numbers  some experience  of  large
scale agricultural  management and production.
But  while  the  scale  at  which  agricultural
production was  managed and output  paid  for
waxed and waned with Maoist  campaigns,  for
much  of  this  time  peasants  simultaneously
worked as members of a co-operative, brigade or
team in larger scale farming, and as household
members in small-holding (peasant) agriculture.
In the Maoist era, three principal factors affected
peasants’  life  chances,  indeed,  their  very
subsistence. The first of these was the weather,
and  the  location  and  fertility  of  their  co-
operative.  Unless  they could alter  their  hukou
and  leave  the  village  co-operative  or  team,
nongmin could not escape these conditions. Even
while  some  intra-village  material  inequalities
declined, therefore,  very significant inequalities
between rural communities remained, rooted in
quality  of  land  and  land-population  ratios  for
example,  as  well  as  between  urban  and  rural
populations.  People  in  some  parts  of  the
countryside, writes Selden, ‘suffered severely in
poor  diets,  clothing,  housing  and  other
necessities  as  well  as  in  access  to  education,
culture, and other amenities relative to those in
more amply provided areas’.27
The second factor affecting life chances was class
designation. To prevent the resurgence of the bad
classes,  c lass  designations  were  made
patrilineally  heritable  and  recorded  in  hukou
booklets  and  personal  dossiers.  Inter-
generational class mobility was thereby curtailed.
As a famous Cultural Revolution slogan put it, ‘If
the father’s a revolutionary, the son’s a hero; if
the father’s  a  reactionary,  the son’s  a  bastard!’
Consequently, in what appears to be a reversal of
hypergamous  marriage  traditions,  families
sought poor and middle peasants as grooms for
their daughters, and shunned suitors whose bad
class  designation  would  be  passed  on  to
offspring.  However,  as  men  of  poor  peasant
lineage were now of superior social standing, the
brides  were still  marrying ‘up’.  Children were
instilled  with  a  clear  understanding  of  class
nomenclature, and strong feelings of inferiority if
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their  own  family  bore  the  pariah  designation
‘landlord’ - regardless of the fact that, owing to
the  changes  made  during  land  reform  and
collectivization,  they  no  longer  owned  land.28
According to Gao the characters for classes were
among  the  first  children  learned  to  read  and
write at school.29
Third,  kinship  networks  and  patron-client  ties
that radiated out from positions of power in local
commune,  br igade  and  team  (vi l lage)
organizational hierarchies differentiated people’s
prospects  in life.  Communist  Party cadres and
brigade  and  production  team  leaders  who
decided  on  production,  assigned  and  valued
tasks,  and  managed  collective  investments,
income and the distribution of  cash payments,
produce and relief funds could bestow plenty or
condemn families to hunger and want. In many
locations cadres shirked work, and monopolized
scarce  resources,  opportunities  and  privileges.
Although  grievances  about  cadres’  abuses  of
power  were  widespread,  Li  Huaying  explains
that  most  peasants  dared  not  ‘vent’  because
cadres’ patronage was essential to family well-
being.30
Fixed  in  geographic  and  social–structural
positions  in  the  collective  order,  village
households  competed  among  themselves  for
scarce  resources  and  oppor tuni t i es .
Egalitarianism  among  the  good  classes
strengthened,  but  they  also  invoked  bad  class
designations  to  practice  discriminatory
distribution  and  social  closure.  Good  classes
were given priority in the distribution of goods,
including  special  foods,  membership  in  the
Communist  Party  branch  and  Poor-and-Lower
Middle  Peasants’  Association,  more  desirable
jobs  and  whatever  welfare  benefits  the  co-
operative could provide. Bad class elements came
last and received least. They were barred from
political  organizations,  and  sometimes  even
primary  schools  and  clinics,  and  routinely
excluded  from  village  meetings,  feasts  and
festivities. According to one of Jonathan Unger’s
Chen  Village  interviewees,  ‘They  were  treated
like lepers. If you greeted them your class stand
was  considered  questionable.  They  had  no
friends.  They  didn’t  dare  talk  to  each  other,
either’.31  Bad  class  designations  also  exposed
people  to  recurrent  violence  during  periodic
political  campaigns.  Ritualized  public
performances were held in which members of the
good classes remembered the ‘bitterness’ of their
previous  lives  and  denounced  bad  class
elements.  After  Mao  Zedong  warned  of  the
emergence of a ‘new’ ruling class in 1965, work
teams  once  again  were  dispatched  to  the
countryside to lead the poor and middle peasants
in  reviewing  households’  class  designation,
identifying  ‘rotten’  cadres,  and  attacking  their
old and ‘new’ class enemies.
Equally  profound,  however,  were  the  changes
that  agricultural  hukou  wrought  in  peasants’
relations  with  other  classes.  In  official
pronouncements, members of the working class
were described as the owners and masters of the
means of production. Though many workers no
doubt  looked  on  Party  leaders  and  factory
managers as their masters, compared to peasants
workers  nonetheless  enjoyed enviable  working
and  living  conditions,  including  heavily
subsidized  food,  housing,  transport,  superior
education and health care, regulated eight-hour
days on fixed wage grades, early retirement and
state-funded pensions. In a 1956 speech on ‘The
Ten  Major  Relationships’,  Mao  called  for
adjustments  in  the  imbalanced  relationships
between  industry  and  agriculture,  state  and
agricultural  co-operatives,  and  state  and
peasantry.32  Nevertheless,  in  the following two
decades the state continued to sustain high rates
of accumulation by using compulsory production
and  procurement  quotas  and  low  prices  for
agricultural  produce  to  siphon  rural  surpluses
into  industr ia l  investment  and  urban
consumption.  Through  the  hukou  system,  the
peasantry was locked into low-paid, collectively
managed labour on the land. Groups of peasants
recruited  to  labour  as  temporary  and  contract
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workers in urban industries received the lowest
wages and benefits for performing the hardest,
dirtiest jobs. Although some worked for years in
urban  enterprises,  they  could  not  bring  their
families with them, and were segregated on the
shop  floor  and  excluded  from  the  enterprise-
centred  Party  and  union  organizations,  social
community  and  welfare  enti t lements .
Intermarriage  between  urban  and  temporary
peasant  workers  was  exceptionally  rare.  In
political  and  economic  plans  and  practice,
therefore,  peasants  formed  a  class  that  was
exploited by the state to the benefit of its cadres
and urban workers.
Politically,  too,  peasants  as  a  class  were
disadvantaged  in  their  relations  with  other
classes.  Nationally,  Communist  Party
membership  was  overwhelmingly  rural  at  the
creation of  the  People’s  Republic  in  1949.  The
proportionate membership of the working class
and  military  increased  relative  to  that  of  the
peasantry  from  the  1950s  to  the  late  1970s.
Though most sub-provincial leaders came from
the peasantry, few rose to positions in the central
Party  and  government.33  Nor  were  peasants
represented in  or  by  a  ‘mass  organization’,  in
contrast  to  workers  whose  interests  were
supposed  to  be  represented  by  the  All-China
Federation of Trades Union, or women who were
supposedly  represented  by  the  Women’s
Federation.
During the Maoist era, Chinese rural society was
characterized by a  politically  charged,  inelastic
system  of  class  designations.  Ascribed  class
designations coloured every family’s view of its
position relative to other families in their village.
It affected everything from what food they could
eat,  how much they might earn and who they
might marry, to whether they had any influence
in  collective  decision-making.  Jonathan  Unger
has  argued  that  because  certain  families  were
distinguished from others in their community by
patronage  relations  and  the  symbolic  and
political  capital  acquired  from  good  class
designations,  peasants  formed  status  groups
rather than a class.34  However, almost all these
families  nonetheless  were  bound  to  an
agricultural  occupation  and  a  largely  self-
supporting residential  community.  Their access
to  land,  and  their  participation  in,  and
remuneration  from  collective  production  were
dic ta ted  by  the  s ta te  –  through  cadre
management  of  labour,  compulsory  state
procurement and the suppression of markets –
with  the  specific  aim  of  transferring  the
agricultural surplus to fund industrialization and
provide  public  goods  such  as  housing,  health
care,  welfare  and  physical  infrastructure  for  a
growing  urban  population.  Although  intra-
village  community  differences  in  living
conditions remained (primarily based on family
labor power),  they were less  extreme than the
inequalities  in  food  availability,  welfare  and
opportunities  for  social  advancement  that
differentiated collective peasant farmers from the
non-agricultural population. And peasants used
the vocabulary of class to describe themselves as
a class that was disadvantaged relative to cadres,
intellectuals and urban workers. In this regard,
they formed a class that was distinguished by its
relations with other social formations if no longer
rooted in unequal land ownership relations. But
what eventually galvanized the peasant class into
collective  action  were  the  Party’s  repeated
campaigns and the imperative to identify class
enemies in its midst, so as to secure scarce rural
resources, rather than contestation against other
social formations.
The disappearing peasantry: 1979–2014
In the 1981 Resolution on Certain Questions in
the History of Our Party since the Founding of
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the People’s Republic of China,  China’s leaders
rejected Mao’s thesis that class struggle persists
in socialist society, and called for an end to class
designations.35  They  did  not,  however,  end  or
even ameliorate the deep inequalities caused by
the  hukou  system,  which  to  the  present  day
continue  to  disadvantage  people  registered  as
nongmin.  The  leadership’s  subsequent
propagation  of  a  new  rhetoric  of  economic
reform,  social  harmony  and  construction  of  a
‘well-off’  society  was  intended  to  rebuild
Communist Party support among a population
weary  of  divisive  campaigns  and  eager  for
improved  living  standards.  The  challenge  that
arose, though, was that whilst transforming the
socialist  planned  economy  into  a  market
economy, cadres capitalized on their positions to
enrich themselves and their families. By the end
of  the  1980s,  in  the  popular  imagination  the
archetypal  class  enemy,  ‘landlord’,  had  been
replaced by that of ‘corrupt official’. Concerned
by  protests  against  corruption  and  growing
inequality,  China’s  leaders  steered  social
reportage away from class, and toward the less
contentious discourse of occupational and social
stratification.  Markets,  human  capital  and
entrepreneurship, rather than unequal property
ownership, political virtues, or even residential
registration,  became  the  officially  recognised
sources of stratification.
Rural de-collectivization was at the forefront of
market  reforms.  Chinese  scholars  generally
id en t i f y  two  ma in  p ro c e s s e s  i n  d e -
collectivization.  The  first  entailed  the  de-
collectivization  of  property  and  gradual
deregulation  of  agricultural  product  prices.36
Between  the  mid  1970s  and  early  1980s  most
villages distributed contracts to use collectively-
owned  farmland  among  households.  The
quantity of land received by each household was
supposed to reflect household size, producing a
roughly  equal  distribution  of  land  use-rights
within  each  village.  In  practice,  some  villages
allocated  unmarried  sons  an  additional  land
share in the expectation that they would ‘bring
in’  wives,  while  unmarried  daughters  were
expected to ‘marry out’, and received no land.
Concurrently, state prices for agricultural output
were  raised,  the  scope  of  state  procurement
diminished,  and  controls  on  the  marketing  of
produce  l i f ted.  Farmers  responded  by
diversifying  production  and  specializing  in
higher value crops for sale.  By the turn of the
century, prices for most products had been de-
regulated.
By  2002,  rural  households  had  gained  more
secure, longer term tenure, and their bundle of
land use rights had expanded: land use contracts
were extended to periods of 30 years for arable
land and up to 70 years for forests; without the
agreement  of  two-thirds  of  villagers  and
approval  of  town  and  county  governments,
villages  were  prohibited  from  unilaterally
resuming and reallocating farmers’ land during
the contract  term;  and contract  holders  legally
were  permitted  to  sub-lease,  transfer  and
bequeath their use rights to farmland. Contracted
land use  rights  differed from private  property
ownership in that they could not be mortgaged
or alienated from the collective.
Philip  Huang,  Gao  Yuan  and  Yusheng  Peng
argue that collective land ownership moderated
the  disequalizing impacts  of  rapid  agricultural
commoditization and industrialization, because it
prevented the ‘distress’ selling of land after crop
failures  or  to  pay  off  debts.37  Hence,  whereas
unequal land ownership was a key cause of class
inequality in the pre-revolutionary period, it was
not a significant contributor to rural inequality in
the  post-Mao  period.  On  the  other  hand,
formerly  collective  assets  like  machinery  and
factories  were privatized in the late  1980s and
1990s.  In  contrast  to  the  de-collectivization  of
land, this was a highly disequalizing process, and
in many locations,  disproportionately benefited
the village cadres who handled the sales.38 These
privatized assets subsequently could be used as
collateral to raise bank loans.
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Second,  with the  demise  of  collective  farming,
rural  households  were  able  to  allocate  their
labour  resources  to  non-agricultural  activities.
Self-employment,  home-based  and  small
businesses and township and village enterprises
(TVEs) – many of which initially were established
as collective enterprises and subsequently were
privatised  –  flourished.  In  the  late  1980s  and
throughout  the  1990s  the  relaxation  of  state
controls over employment decisions and profits
in urban enterprises increased demand for cheap
migrant labour, leading to growing rural–urban
migration.
Labour flowed out of China’s agricultural sector
at  a  rate  and  scale  unprecedented  in  human
history.  The  proportion  of  the  labour  force
engaged in agriculture fell from over 70 per cent
in 1978, to 36.7 percent in 2010, and 29.5 percent
in  2014.39  Among  the  379  million  people  of
working age registered as nongmin in 2014, most
were  fully  or  partly  employed  off-farm;  the
‘floating population’ alone (people absent from
their  place  of  residential  registration  for  more
than six months,  and most  of  whom are rural
registered)  numbered 253  million.40  Villages  in
less developed areas came to be inhabited only
by the very young and the elderly, as most able-
bodied adults went out to work. Almost an entire
generation of rural youth grew up never having
tilled the soil: by 2012, over 87 per cent of rural 16
to 35 year olds was employed full time off-farm.41
Owing to the great difficulties migrant workers
encountered in enrolling their children in urban
schools, a significant portion of their remittances
were  reinvested  in  paying  for  children’s
education  in  the  countryside,  and  subsequent
vocational  or  tertiary  training,  movement  and
of f - farm  employment . 4 2  In  short ,  de-
collectivization and labour market reforms led to
a rapid reduction in the number of people with
rural hukou that occupationally were identifiable
as peasants.
Those nongmin still engaged in agriculture began
to be differentiated into peasants and commercial
farmers by their dependence on markets for the
purchase of  production factors like labour and
land, and the sale of  their  output.  On the one
hand,  the  small  average  size  of  land holdings
(nationwide, less than one-fifth of a hectare per
capita  in  2011)  meant  that  only  a  small
percentage  of  agriculturalists  needed  to  hire
labour.43 As Huang, Yuan and Peng point out, in
contrast to India, where around 45 per cent of
agricultural  output  was  produced  using  wage
labour in 2009, in China hired workers produced
less than 5 per cent of grain, 7 per cent of cotton,
9  per  cent  of  vegetables  and  40  per  cent  of
apples.44  Thus,  reliance  on  unwaged  family
members  and  reciprocal  labour  exchanges  in
small scale farming, one of the defining features
of peasants, still characterized much production.
What was new about this peasant labour force,
was that  it  increasingly comprised the elderly,
rather than young and middle-aged adults.
On  the  other  hand,  the  employment  of  wage
labour  in  specialized  agriculture  rapidly
increased.45  In an oft-cited survey conducted in
2012, China’s Ministry of Agriculture found that
877,000  of  China’s  largest  farms  on  average
employed  1.68  long  term  wage  labourers,  in
addition to family members.46 Large commercial
farms producing crops as varied as pulp-wood,
cotton,  coffee  beans,  poultry  and  milk  all
employed  regular  workers.  Small  commercial
farmers  in  high-value  fruit,  vegetable  and
aquaculture  production  also  began  including
casual wages in their routine production costs, as
a  grape stock producer  in  the  wealthy coastal
province of Zhejiang explained to me in 2013:
Unskilled women, they cost around
80  yuan  per  day.  But  grafting  is
skilled work, so we pay the grafters
quite a lot. It’s 200 per day for locals.
The specialist grafters from Liaoning
get paid per graft, 5 mao47 per graft.
Plus we then have to spend money
on  fertilizers  and  materials,  so
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altogether  the  cost  of  establishing
one  grafted  grape  vine  is  9  mao.
Then there  are  the  costs  of  water,
advert i s ing ,  t ransport .  But
depending on the market, the vines
migh t  on ly  s e l l  f o r  4  yuan .
(Interview,  Jindong  District,
Zhejiang,  17  May  2012)
Migrant agricultural specialists grafting grape vines, Zhejiang 2013 (photo
by Sally Sargeson)
Between  2008  and  2013,  China’s  central
government issued a series of policy documents
s e t t i n g  ou t  i t s  v i s i on  o f  a  mode rn ,
commercialised  agricultural  sector.  This  vision
centred on expanding the scale of production by
promoting land rental, and the capitalization and
commercialization  of  production.48  Rental
markets  in agricultural  land grew, reaching 26
per cent  of  the total  area farmed by 2013.49  In
coastal provinces such as Zhejiang, where most
rural  household income derived from off-farm
work, around 70 per cent of village households
were renting out farmland.50  Much of this land
was offered for comparatively long term leases of
5  or  10  years  on  government  created  ‘land
transfer’  auction  sites.  In  2013,  the  advertised
annual  rent  for  rice  paddy  in  Zhejiang  was
between 600 and 800 yuan per mu per annum,
while  shrimp and  crab  ponds  cost  over  1,100
yuan per mu51 per annum for a ten year lease.
Landlessness also re-emerged,  though this was
less a consequence of villagers’ distress-sales of
their  contracted  use  rights  to  land  and  large
commercial  farmers’  concentration  of  leased
land,  and  more  because  governments  were
expropriating millions of hectares of farmland to
lease in urban real estate markets. According to
my own estimates,  by  2008  somewhere  in  the
order of 88 million nongmin had lost farmland
through expropriation, and government analysts
indicated that between 2009 and 2030, another 50
million more might be expropriated to make way
for  urban  and  infrastructure  development.52
Because government policies required that rural
residents  whose  land  was  expropriated  be
offered the opportunity to  re-register  as  urban
residents, however, it was difficult to calculate at
any point in time how many of the expropriated
were  still  registered  as  nongmin,  and  what
number had become urban residents. Nor would
it be entirely accurate to define all these landless
people as ‘dispossessed’. Around the margins of
China’s  expanding  cities  and  towns,  some
villagers  strategized  to  have  collective  land
expropriated  in  return  for  high  compensation
packages .  And  some  o f  these  peop le
subsequently  used  the  compensation  they
received for loss of their shares in the land, as
well  as  lost  land  use  rights,  crops  and  other
assets,  to  purchase  urban  apartments,  social
insurance,  and  small  businesses.  Especially  in
areas  of  mass  in-migration,  such  as  the  Pearl
River  and  Yangtze  deltas,  many  expropriated
hou s eho l d s  d i d  we l l  f r om  r e n t i n g
accommodation to rural  migrant workers from
other regions. But in addition, many millions of
expropriated nongmin were indeed dispossessed
without adequate (much less just) compensation,
and  were  forced  to  supplement  their  meagre
state welfare payments by repairing appliances,
selling trinkets, street sweeping and scavenging.
As agriculturalists of all types were incorporated
into  widening  c i rcui ts  o f  capi ta l  and
commodities,  more  inputs  were  sourced  from
global  and  national  corporations.  The  costs  of
patented  hybrid  seeds,  fertilizers,  pesticides,
irrigation  and  greenhouse  infrastructure  and
technical training rose.  Moreover,  after China’s
government  approved  the  operations  of
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commercial credit providers,  domestic financial
capital expanded into the countryside.53  Former
rural cadres and large commercial farmers made
use of their connections in government and rural
financial  institutions  to  acquire  subsidized
resources  and  the  lions’  share  of  loans.54
Increasingly, output also was sold on markets. In
2015  Yan  and  Chen  estimated  that  by  2012,
almost  100  per  cent  of  vegetables,  cotton  and
fruit, and 85 per cent of all grains, were sold on
the  market.55  Agricultural  producers  faced
growing  competition  for  market  niches.
Lucrative supply contracts were monopolized by
large farmers who could market online, negotiate
affordable  transport  costs  and  deliver  regular
bulk  orders  to  major  wholesalers.  Market
expansion  increased  small  producers’
vulnerability to pressure from global buyers such
as  Nestlé  and  domestic  wholesalers.  Urban
governments bent on reconstruction closed down
many wet markets that had accommodated small
independent vendors and allocated the sites to
supermarket  chains.56  Wholesalers’  unified
purchasing schemes forced producers  to  lower
their  prices  or  accept  annual  payment  for
meeting  delivery  contracts,  wiping  out  small
farmers’  profit  margins.  As  a  Zhejiang  farmer
providing  trees  to  urban  landscapers  in
Shanghai, Henan and Jiangxi complained to me,
We only get paid by the wholesalers
once  each  year,  after  the  spring
festival. We still  haven’t been paid
for last year’s deliveries. A year or
so ago, one of the local wholesalers
ran off owing us growers hundreds
of thousands of yuan. We often get
screwed. If trees die on the way to
market, they return them to us, so
we bear  the  risk  of  transport  and
storage too.’ (Interview, Changxing
County, Zhejiang, 20 March 2013)
Factor  and  produce  markets  differentiated
commercial and peasant producers even in less
developed provinces. In one mountainous village
in Yunnan, in 2014 a poor farmer explained to me
how  market  prices  swayed  his  production
decisions:
Q: Do you rent land from others?
A: Yes, 6 or 7 mu.
Q: How much is it per mu?
A: Around 150 (yuan per year).
Q:  How  much  would  you  make
from the crops on the land? Is that
your main source of income?
A: We don’t make much from our
crops,  most of our income is from
raising pigs. We’ve got 60 pigs. But
the price for pork is really low now.
We only get 11 yuan per kilo, but it
costs us over 10 yuan per kilo just to
raise them.
Q:  Then  will  you  keep  on  pig
farming?
A:  We’ll  keep  doing  it,  see  if  the
price rises. It’s the only way we can
get  ahead.  (Interview,  Zhanyi
County,  Yunnan,  7  April  2014)
In  short,  the  expansion  of  markets  not  only
greatly reduced the proportion of agriculturalists
that could be identified occupationally as peasant
farmers,  but  structured  competition  among
agriculturalists  and  disadvantaged  peasants  in
their relations with capitalist farmers, businesses
and the financial sector.
The demise of China’s peasantry can be traced in
social, cultural and political relationships as well.
Largely  as  a  consequence  of  reduced  fertility,
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out-migration  and  family  division,  rural
households declined in size, from an average of
5.5  members  per  household  in  1980,  to  3.8
members  in  2012.57  The  burden of  agricultural
production  and  care-work  was  reallocated
among fewer  adults.58  Despite  their  dwindling
size, rural households also bore much of the cost
of  reproducing  the  vast  rural  migrant  labour
force  that  was  building  China’s  cities  and
producing many of its exports. Certainly, when
employed, migrant workers remitted money to
their village families to support consumption and
pay for  new housing,  education,  medical  care,
and ceremonies associated with marriages, births
and  deaths.  As  most  migrant  workers  lacked
portable medical  and unemployment insurance
until recently, however, their only option in the
event of illness, injury or being laid off was to
return to their villages. He and Ye (2014) suggest
that the weakening of old traditions of filiality
and  intergenerational  reciprocity,  and  inter-
generational  frictions  arising  from  differing
at t i tudes  toward  work ,  romance  and
consumption, reinforced cycles of out-migration,
compromising the well-being of the elderly and
children “left-behind” in the villages.59
Inevitably, part of the costs of rural households’
social  reproduction  began  to  be  socialised,  as
state-subsidized  old-age  pension  and  medical
insurance  schemes  were  extended  to  the
countryside.60  Even in the brief period between
2007 and 2009, for example, research by Liu, Liu
and Huang demonstrates a shift in the sources of
income relied on by the rural elderly (aged over
60) away from family support, and toward own
labour and social assistance.61 By 2015, some 820
million rural and urban people were enrolled in a
national  unified  old-age  pension  program  co-
financed  by  the  government  and  individual
contributors.
Peasant community solidarity also weakened as a
result  of  educational  and  governance  reforms.
Consider the following two trends.  Until  2000,
the  vast  majority  of  rural  children  attended
primary schools in their home villages. Widely
criticised for their inadequate resources and low
educational  standards,  village  schools
nonetheless  allowed  children  to  interact  with
other members of their community, learn about
local  polit ics  and  customs  and  pick  up
rudimentary  agricultural  and  house-holding
skills.  The  closure  of  229,400  village  primary
schools  and  more  than  16,000  middle  schools
between 2000 and 2010 resulted in a surge in the
numbers of rural children either boarding in, or
travelling  more  than  ten  kilometres  daily  to
centralised schools in towns and cities.62  In the
centralised  schools,  children  were  taught  to
internalize  national  aspirations  for  modernity,
and  non-local  teachers’  class  prejudices  and
expectations.63  This  led  to  early  class  sorting.
Children  from entrepreneurial  and commercial
farming households  gained in  confidence,  and
proceeded to  vocational  and higher  education.
Children  from  ‘backward’  peasant  and  out-
migrating  households  disproportionately
dropped out, condemning them to a future either
scratching  a  living  from  small  holdings,  or
joining the unskilled migrant labour force.
Second,  peasant  farmers  became a  minority  in
village  populations  — a  minority  increasingly
marginalised in community governance. Legally,
registration as a village resident entitles all adults
to vote in village elections and assemblies, apply
for contracts to farm land and for a house site,
and receive a share of any dividends paid from
collective income. However, in developed areas,
non-peasant  village  residents  (including
commercial  farmers,  business  people  and  off-
farm workers) began to outnumber, and outvote,
peasants. Village voters began electing people to
the  two  key  leadership  posts,  Village  Party
Secretary and Village Director, precisely because
of  their  expertise,  connections  and  economic
success  in  the  all-important  non-agricultural
realms  of  business.  In  Zhejiang,  by  2009
entrepreneurs  held  leadership  positions  in
around  two-thirds  of  villages;64  in  the  sixteen
Zhejiang villages I visited in 2014 and 2015, all
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but four of the 32 leadership positions were held
either  by  business  people  or  by  commercial
farmers. Similar trends were evident in villages
throughout  China’s  coastal  provinces.  Even  in
less-developed provinces such as Yunnan, village
leaders tended to be more highly educated and
involved in business than most residents.
One  of  the  consequences  of  the  changing
occupational  profile  of  village  residents,
therefore,  was  that  the  preferences  of  the
minority  peasant  population  often  were
subordinated  to  the  preferences  of  the  non-
peasant  majority.  Lower  levels  of  government
prioritised  the  development  of  industry,
commerce  or  rural  tourism  over  agriculture.
Within the agricultural domain, they prioritised
commercial  agriculture  over  subsistence
agriculture. Indeed, Trappel65  demonstrates that
the  commodif icat ion  of  farmland  and
commercialization of agricultural production and
distribution  became key  criteria  against  which
the performance of local government authorities
were evaluated by their superiors. Governments
dictated that land be used for commercial crops
such  as  tobacco,  which  generated  substantial
government  revenue  but  depleted  the  soil  of
nutrients (if grown perennially, without rotation
of legume crops), or produce such as mushrooms
that appealed to urban consumers,  rather than
promoting  crops  that  would  sustain  peasant
livelihoods and support household consumption.
Cheng  and  Ngo,  in  2014,  found  that  local
government  authorities  pressured  households
that refused to produce preferred crops to rent
their land to other growers.66 Around cities across
China,  large  areas  of  land  were  used  for
construction  and  industry  without  adequate
safeguards  against  contamination  of  adjoining
farmland  and  water  sources.  A  government
report in 2014 estimated that nationwide, more
than 19  per  cent  of  arable  land was  seriously
polluted.67
Local governments and village leaders attempted
to  reduce  the  resulting  conflicts  among  class-
differentiated  villagers,  and  among  competing
rural  land  users,  to  cultivate  a  sense  of
community  by  improving  village  services,
encouraging  the  wealthy  to  donate  money for
festivities,  and  holding  evening  cultural
activities. But to date, these initiatives have had
limited success in bridging divisions between the
residual peasantry, and growing populations of
off-farm  and  migrant  workers,  commercial
farmers,  and  business  people.
In politics beyond the village, too, the peasantry
was  being  substituted  by,  and  therefore
becoming  a  hidden,  unrepresented  subject
among,  the  rural  registered  population.  Rural
residential  registration  rather  than  occupation
was used to calculate the occupational makeup of
the Communist Party and People’s Congresses.
And  in  both  organizations  peasants  came  to
comprise  only  a  small  percentage  of  the  rural
registered membership, which in turn was only a
small proportion of total membership: according
to one report, in 2009 only 12.8 percent of the 24
million  rural  registered  Party  members  even
lived in villages.68 In a famous letter addressed to
China’s  leaders  in  2003,  Li  Changping  wrote,
‘peasant organization is at its lowest ebb since the
collectivization of the early 1950s. For not only is
there  a  lack  of  agencies  like  cooperatives  or
producer associations to help link peasants to the
market, but such collective organizations as do
exist are in the hands of Party and government
officials.  … Most  fundamentally,  peasants  lack
any organizations for the defence of their own
interests. 6 9  Although  a  law  and  policies
encouraging the formation of rural cooperatives
were  issued in  the  years  after  Li  Changping’s
letter,  researchers  have  found  that  over  85
percent  of  cooperatives  formed  were  ‘fake’
organisations set up by entrepreneurs to capture
government  subsidies.70  They  were  never
intended  to  improve  conditions  for  peasant
agriculture,  much  less  represent  peasant
interests.
In China’s 21st  century media,  the peasantry is
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represented as  a  repository of  old virtues  and
romantic folk customs, and a backward, naïve,
vulnerable social group. Rarely is it depicted as it
was in the early Maoist era, as a source of social
change or political agency. This is despite the fact
that peasants initiated the contracting of land to
households,  invested  in  township  and  village
enterprises, and – in the course of transforming
China’s  countryside  and  indeed,  its  urban
industries – have become non-peasants. Even in
scholarly discussions on class, peasants seemed
to  be  disappearing.  For  example,  in  the
humanities and social sciences collections of the
China Academic Journals database, between 1963
and  2013  only  twenty  nine  journal  articles
combined the keywords class (shehui jieji)  and
nongmin.  Conversely,  as  Alexander  Day
concludes, contemporary Chinese debates about
the  peasantry  elide  questions  about  their  class
positioning: ‘Whether peasants were talked about
as  a  vulnerable  or  weak  social  group  (ruoshi
qunti), as state dependents or as a group with a
separate cultural and economic logic, what was
usually at best partially articulated was how they
fit within contemporary class dynamics’.71
To be sure, people registered as rural residents
continued  to  think  of  themselves,  and  were
referred to by others as, nongmin, regardless of
where they actually lived and how they made a
living. Nongmin still were treated unequally in
China’s political economy, and often described as
‘second-class’  citizens  with  regard  to  working
conditions and welfare provision. But it was the
state-imposed  restrictions  on  their  rural
residential  registration  and  associated  policies,
and  modernist  prejudices,  rather  than  their
reliance upon agriculture and family labour, and
limited  market  exposure,  that  rendered  most
nongmin ‘second class’ in these relationships.
In  sum,  in  the  early  21st  century,  far-reaching
structural and systemic changes in the economy –
many of which were initiated and propelled by
the aspirations and activities of peasants – have
commoditized agricultural  labour,  land,  capital
and produce, and turned peasants into a small,
subterranean  class  among  a  highly  variegated
rural-registered  population.  Rural  cadres  and
entrepreneurs  exercised  political  influence  and
accumulated  wealth,  which  was  flaunted  in
opulent  housing,  vehicles,  weddings  and
banquets. As the expansion of markets allowed
wealth to be parlayed into political, cultural and
social capital, the children of these new rural rich
began crossing class  and hukou boundaries  to
join the urban middle class and bourgeoisie. The
owners  of  businesses  providing  agricultural
producers  with  machinery,  bulk  inputs  and
insurance  and  linking  them  with  wholesale
markets similarly worked, lived, socialized and
intermarried with members of the middle class
and bourgeoisie. Especially in developed areas,
commercial  farmers  routinely  participated  in
property,  labour  and  commodity  markets  and
interacted  socially  with  urban  small  business
people, rather than the peasants they employed
on a casual basis. A growing population of rural
landless  fragmented  into  rentier  and  self-
employed members  of  the  petit  bourgeoisie,  a
reserve  army  of  wage  labour  and  welfare
dependants.  Some  members  of  the  remaining
peasantry  became  semi-proletarianized,72
compelled  to  sell  their  labour  to  supplement
households’  income  from farming  small  plots,
and  simultaneously  dependent  on  farming  to
compensate for migrant members’ insecure work,
low  wages  and  limited  social  and  old  age
protection, and because they lacked the capital
necessary  to  either  expand  agricultural
production or invest in businesses. Struggling to
compete in factor and commodity markets, and
increasingly  marginalized  in  village  and
government  decision  making,  legislative
representation,  media  productions  and  social
commentary, at the beginning of the 21st century
China’s  peasantry  was  a  declining  social
formation.
The passing of the peasantry? Two scenarios
By 2030, China’s urban population is expected to
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reach 1 billion, around 70 percent of the national
total.73  Urbanization,  according  to  Premier  Li
Keqiang ‘presents the most powerful and lasting
internal driving force for economic growth in this
country’.74  Although some have cautioned that
China  will  continue  to  have  a  large  rural
population  in  the  near  future,75  there  is  a
widespread assumption that the great majority of
peasants  will  disappear,  either  as  a  result  of
moving to and working in towns and cities, or
their  transformation  into  commercial  farmers,
commuters or service providers.
Indeed, this seems to be one of the explicit goals
of  China’s  leadership.  In  repeated  documents,
China’s  central  government  has  encouraged
industrial  and  commercial  capital  to  invest  in
agriculture,  promoted  rental  markets  in
farmlands,  and  advocated  the  scaling  up  of
agricultural  production  by  commercially-
oriented farming households,  cooperatives  and
agribusinesses employing wage labour. There are
competing  arguments  among  Chinese  scholars
about how this transformation of the peasantry is
to be achieved. By way of conclusion, then, here I
outline alternative visions for the passing of the
peasantry as a class in the early 21st century.
It is a fundamental tenet of liberal thought that
markets  enhance  individual  freedoms.  China’s
liberal  scholars  similarly  view  the  market
economy as the means by which peasants will
free themselves from their historic subordination
and exploitation: subordination and exploitation,
first,  by the landlords,  and then in the Maoist
period, by the state’s planning bureaucracy and
co-operative  cadres.  In  this  view,  residual
collective institutions, particularly collective land
ownership,  still  bind  peasants  to  the  soil,
discourage  investment  in  mechanization  and
encourage risk-averse ‘small peasant’ farming.76
The final ‘liberation’ of the peasantry therefore
requires  the  elimination  of  these  collective
institutions.
For liberals such as Qin Hui, the key question yet
to be resolved is ‘which of the only two possible
paths  rural  China  should  take  –  the  opposite
roads  to  agrarian  capitalism that  Lenin  called
Prussian and American: ‘the expropriation of the
peasantry  from  above  by  big  landlords  or
companies, as in nineteenth century Prussia, or
the emergence of independent small-to-medium
modern  farmers  from below,  as  in  nineteenth
century  America’.77  Like  Qin,  many  Chinese
experts  opt  for  the  second path  and advocate
privatization  of  the  land.  In  articles  widely
circulated among China’s leadership in 2007, for
example, Li Chenggui of the Academy of Social
Sciences  recommended  that  privatization  be
accomplished  in  two  stages.  All  legislation
should first  be  revised and the  mortgaging of
rural  land  permitted.  Then  within  a  decade,
villagers should be granted full ownership rights.
This  would establish  the  institutional  basis  on
which uncompetitive peasant households could
willingly sell  their  land to  farmers  wanting to
expand  their  holdings,  allowing  the  former
peasants  to  fund  their  transformation  into
entrepreneurs, workers and self-funded retirees.
Land  privatization  thereby  could  facilitate  the
scaling  up  commercial  agricultural  production
and sustained capital accumulation.78
Another  essential  requirement  for  this
transformation of the peasantry is the elimination
of  the  residential  registration  system  that
underpinned the early Maoist push for primitive
socialist  accumulation  and  which,  under  post-
Mao  market  reforms,  continues  to  render
peasants  ‘second  class’  citizens  and  easily
exploitable  migrant  workers.  Dismantling  this
system would give those currently registered as
nongmin  the  right  to  choose  their  place  of
residence, compete on an equal basis for urban
jobs, receive equal labour protections and union
membership, and have equal access to publicly-
funded education, health care and welfare goods.
Lu Xueyi, argued: ‘We need to create a unified
market  of  over  one billion people.  We can no
longer continue with divided markets in the city
and  the  countryside  and  lock  900  million
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peasants out of the cities’.79 Though cynics might
hasten to point out that rural registered people
are by no means ‘locked out’ of China’s cities –
and, on the contrary, probably helped build and
provide services to those contemporary cities –
Lu’s  argument  nonetheless  has  gained
widespread  support.  It  is  fiercely  resisted,
though,  by  the  influential  governments  and
resident  beneficiaries  of  China’s  richest  cities,
which  are  loathe  to  share  their  generously
funded education, health care and welfare goods
with non-locals.
Privatization of land and the elimination of the
residential  system  also  are  viewed  by  liberal
scholars as the means of eliminating the social
and  political  conservatism  they  associate  with
‘small  peasant’  production,  and  empowering
former  peasants  politically.  As  propertied
citizens, they would possess the motivation and
legal and material resources with which to better
resist  the  arbitrary  power,  taxation  and
depredation80
That  liberal  vision is  fiercely  contested.  Critics
argue that liberals’ recommended reforms would
condemn China’s peasants ‘to repeat the tragedy
that already has been played out in many third-
world  countries,  where  numerous  farmers
became landless, then jobless, then homeless, and
eventually  hopeless’.81  He  Xuefeng  and  Wen
Tiejun, for example, insist that neither Prussian
nor  American  paths  to  moderni ty  are
appropriate—or  available—for  China.82  The
country’s  population to  land ratio  is  too high,
there  are  insufficient  jobs  to  employ  people
surplus to the needs of a large scale, mechanized
agricultural economy, and capital is still flowing
out of agriculture into more profitable ventures.83
Besides, in the small-holding peasant economy,
land and labour are not (yet) fully commoditized.
Instead,  collective  land  remains  a  critically
important subsistence resource and safety net not
only for  the rural  elderly,  but  also for  tens of
millions  of  migrant  peasant-workers  who  are
vulnerable  to  incapacitation  in  industrial
accidents  and  redundancy  due  to  cyclical
contractions in global consumer demand. In fact,
peasan t  f a rming  underp ins  Ch ina ’ s
competitiveness in markets for low-cost, labour
intensive manufactures.
That critique informs a radically different vision
of the future for China’s peasantry. As Alexander
Day has shown, in proposals that unite China’s
‘new  left’  with  populists  who  champion  the
contemporary  utility  of  indigenous  peasant
institutions,  collective  land  ownership,
household  capital  and  village  co-operative
economic organization is presented as the most
effect ive  means  of  protect ing  China’s
smallholding  agriculturalists  from  the  harsh
discipline  of  post-Fordist  capitalism.84  Co-
operatives’ development and leasing of collective
land  would  finance  the  construction  of  rural
infrastructure, industry and services – inter-alia
increasing  off-farm  employment  –  and  fund
collective goods such as villagers’ health care and
social insurance. Through co-operatives, farming
households would gain access  to  cheap credit,
and  scale  advantages  in  purchasing  and
marketing. This would assist them in competing
with  agribusinesses  and  commercial  farmers.
Rural households therefore could engage in what
Yan and Chen refer to as ‘capitalization without
capitalism’.85  As joint owners of collective land
and  shareholders  in  agricultural  co-operatives,
villagers  also  would  have  the  motivation  and
organizational and material resources with which
to invest in household reproduction, protect their
common interests and conserve regional peasant
cultures.
In  the  imagination  of  these  ‘new  left’  and
populist scholars, contrary to the predictions of
liberal scholars and the class theorists cited at the
beginning of this paper, China’s peasantry will
not  inevitably  disappear  as  a  consequence  of
voluntary migration and occupational shifts, or
rural  dispossession,  debt  and  impoverishment.
Instead they envisage a viable future for small-
holding agriculturalists, a future in which former
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peasants  would  comprise  an  economically,
politically  and  socially  progressive  class  of
co l lec t ive ly  organized  land-owning
entrepreneurs,  capitalized  farmers,  and
shareholding  employees.
But  would  such  people  constitute  peasants?
Surely not according to the definition of peasant
used in this  paper.  By that  rigorous,  if  simple
criteria, at least, the demise of China’s peasantry
as a class seems inevitable.
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